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APPELLANTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The the District Court!s dismissal of all of Plaintiff's 
Causes of Action, being: 1) Defamation; 2) Injurious Falsehood; 3) 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and 4) Invasion of 
Privacy was erroneous for the following reasons: 
1. The Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment (Pages 
30-39 of the record) and the trial court's MEMORANDUM DECISIONS of 
11-7-84 (Pages 109-110 of the record) and 12-6-84 (Pages 119-120 
of the record) were only directed to the issues set forth in 
Plaintiff's First Cause of Action (Defamation); 
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2. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to 
apply the proper judicial guidelines for ruling on Summary 
Judgment Mot i ons. 
3. The Court erred by abusing its discretion in that it 
went beyond the parameters of a Motion for Summary Judgment and, 
in essence, tried Plaintiff's case on the merits as opposed to 
limiting its ruling to those issues appropriately before the Court 
on a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
4. The trial court erred in that it did not view 
Plaintiff's pleadings and facts in a light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff and make a determination as to whether there were any 
material facts in dispute, as was required by established Utah 
case law . 
5. The signing of the Order for Summary Judgment (Pages 
111-112 of the record) on 11-15-84, by the Judge, is manifest 
error in that the Order was improperly signed prior to the 
expiration of the time limits set forth in the Rules of Practice 
of the District Courts and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff (Appellant) was Director of Parks for the City of 
Logan, Utah. On May 11, 1982 he was suspended from employment by 
the Mayor of Logan, Utah, with no reasons given, pending an 
investigation. On June 7, 1982 Plaintiff (Appellant) received a 
notice that the City's investigation was completed and that his 
employment with the city was terminated. Once again, no reasons 
were given for the termination nor was the scope or findings of 
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the investigation revealed. Much publicity surrounded the 
PlaintiffTs (Appellant's) suspension and termination, with the 
public being made aware by the city, and/or its employees, that an 
investigation had taken place, and that a further investigation 
would continue. Since neither the scope nor findings of the 
investigation were made public, coupled with the fact that the 
Plaintiff (Appellant) was terminated upon completion of the 
investigation, an aura of suspicion, as to the conduct and acts 
engaged in by the Plaintiff leading to his termination, was 
created through innuendo. Rumors and further inuendos of criminal 
wrongdoing surfaced, however, Plaintiff (Appellant) was never 
given any information as to the scope or findings of the 
investigation or reasons for his firing. After several Motions to 
Dismiss were filed by the Defendants and granted, a prior appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court (Case No. 19509) was filed. This Court 
remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. 
Discovery was conducted and a Motion for Summary Judgment (Pages 
30-39 of the record) was filed by Defendants and argued before 1st 
District Court Judge VeNoy Christofferson who granted Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to his 11/7/84 Memorandum 
Decision. (Pages 109-110 of the record). Defendants prepared a 
Proposed Order for Summary Judgment (Pages 111-112 of the record) , 
to which Plaintiff filed an Objection (Pages 113-115 of the 
record). Judge Christofferson signed and entered the order on 11-
15-84 and subsequently, in a 12/6/84 Memorandum Decision (Pages 
119-120 of the record), denied Plaintiff's Objection. Plaintiff 
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(Appellant) filed his Notice of Appeal (Page 123 of the record) on 
January 28, 1985. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment (Pages 
30-39 of the record) and the trial court!s MEMORANDUM DECISIONS of 
11-7-84 (Pages 109-110 of the record) and 12-6-84 (Pages 119-120 
of the record) were only directed to the issues set forth in 
Plaintiff's First Cause of Action (Defamation). As such, the 
Court had no basis upon which to dismiss Plaintiff's Second, 
Third, and Fourth Causes of Action, since each Cause of Action is 
an independent theory of recovery. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to 
apply the proper judicial guidelines for ruling on Summary 
Judgment Motions as set forth in HOLBROOK v. ADAMS, 542 P2d 191 
(1975) . 
3. The Court erred by abusing its discretion in that it 
went beyond the parameters of a Motion for Summary Judgment and, 
in essence, tried PlaintifPs case on the merits as opposed to 
limiting its ruling to those issues appropriately before the Court 
on a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
4. The trial court erred in that it did not view 
Plaintiff's pleadings and facts in a light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff and make a determination as to whether there were any 
material facts in dispute, as was required by established Utah 
case law . 
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5. The signing of the Order for Summary Judgment (Pages 
111-112 of the record) on 11-15-84, by the Judge, is manifest 
error in that the Order was improperly signed prior to the 
expiration of the five (5) day time limit set forth in rule 2.9(b) 
of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts. Rule 6(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure must be read in conjunction with 
Rule 2.9(b), thus precluding the Judge from signing the Order for 
Summary Judgment until the expiration of eight (8) days from the 
date of service of the Order on opposing counsel. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. The Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment (Pages 30-39 
of the record) and the trial court's MEMORANDUM DECISIONS of 11-7-
84 (Pages 109-110 of the record) and 12-6-84 (Pages 119-120 of the 
record) were only directed to the issues set forth in Plaintiff's 
First Cause of Action (Defamation). As such, the Court had no 
basis upon which to dismiss Plaintiff's Second, Third, and Fourth 
Causes of Action, since each Cause of Action is an independent 
theory of recovery. As to each theory Defendants must 
independently "show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law". (Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56). 
As can be seen from Defendants1 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Pages 35-39 of the record), dated 
April 12, 1984, Defendants only attack Plaintiff's Cause of Action 
for Defamation, their first Cause of Action. Further, this 
MEMORANDUM states: "A careful examination of the Amended Complaint 
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indicates that the only claim made is one of defamation and 
damages arising therefrom." This unequivocally evidences that 
Defendants incorrectly read PlaintifPs Amended Complaint, for 
whatever reasons, and incorrectly conceptualized the Amended 
Complaint as only making a claim for defamation. 
The Court, in its 11/7/84 MEMORANDUM DECISION (Pages 109-110 
of the record), erroneously ruled on all four causes of action due 
to the fact that Defendants 1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and 
accompanying MEMORANDUM (Pages 30-39 of the record) only attack, 
address, and frame for the Court the issue of Defamation (First 
Cause of Action). The Court further compounded its error by 
stating in its the 11/7/84 MEMORANDUM DECISION (Pages 109-110 of 
the record): "The Court feels that such a statement does not give 
rise to any cause of action or defamation or any other relief 
asked for in the complaint. Nor do anyother actions or statements 
alleged to have been by the Mayor in the pleading give rise to any 
cause of action." This excerpt evidences that the Court used the 
wrong standard in ruling on a MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. The 
language used by the Court sounds in a Rule 12(b) Motion to 
Dismiss for "failure to state a cause of action upon which relief 
may be granted," as opposed to the correct Summary Judgment 
standard of "no genuine issue as to any material fact." 
Though the Court attempted to correct itself by way of its 
12/6/84 MEMORANDUM DECISION (Pages 119-120 of the record), the 
manifest error still remains in the record that the Court viewed 
the MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT through motion to dismiss glasses 
and made a determination under motion to dismiss standards. 
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II. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to 
apply the proper judicial guidelines for ruling on Summary 
Judgment Motions as set forth in HOLBROOK v. ADAMS, 542 P2d 191 
(1975) . 
The HOLBROOK case states that: "It is not the purpose of the 
summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the 
averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. 
Neither is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve 
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate the time, 
trouble and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts 
as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled 
to prevail. Only when it so appears, is the Court justified in 
refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting his evidence 
and attempting to persuade the fact trier to his views. 
Conversely, if there is any dispute as to any issue, material to 
the settlement of the controversy, the summary judgment should not 
be granted." 
This Court has upheld the HOLBROOK guidelines as recently as 
1984 in the case of W.W. AND W.B. GARDNER, INC. v. MANN, 680 P2d 
23 (1984), wherein this Court, citing HOLBROOK, further stated: 
!It only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the 
iverments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue 
)f fact. This is analogous to the elemental rule that the fact 
rier may believe one witness as against many, or many against 
me." 
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Summary Judgment was not appropriate in the instant case 
because genuine issues of fact and law were presented to the Judge 
and still exist. 
Appellant alleged, under the First Cause of Action in his 
Amended Complaint, that the Respondents defamed Appellant through 
various statements, actions, and inactions attributable to 
Respondents, beginning on or about May 4, 1982. Respondents, in 
pursuing their Motion for Summary Judgment attempted to counter 
the defamation issue by submitting the affidavit (Pages 32-34 of 
the record) of one of the Defendants, Mayor Newell Daines, wherein 
he made self-serving statements and legal conclusions. Only 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of said affidavit bear directly on the 
defamation issue. This is the only item Respondents put forth to 
the District Court in attempting to show that there was no genuine 
issue of fact as to the Defamation issue. Appellant, on the other 
hand, to show that a genuine issue of fact existed as to the 
Defamation issue, took the deposition of Dale O. Nelson (See 
addendum attached hereto), and filed said deposition with the 
Court. Mr. Nelson's deposition was relied upon in Appellants 9-5-
84 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (Pages 93-100 of 
the record), and referred to in AppellantTs oral argument before 
the District Court on 11-7-84 (See addendum attached hereto). 
Pages 8 and 9 of Mr. NelsonTs deposition put the defamation 
allegation in Appellantfs Amended Complaint squarely in issue, at 
least factually, as against Respondent Daines' Affidavit. This is 
illustrated as follows: 
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4/12/84 Daines Affidavit 5/23/84 Nelson Deposition 
(Pages 32-34 of the record) 
1(4 "That I have never at any time 
publicized any reasons for the 
termination of Mr. Eames, and 
in particular, I have never 
stated publicly or published 
any statements about Mr. Eames 
that were false or that could 
in any way be construed as 
injurious to the reputation, 
name or calling of Mr. Eames." 
115. "I have read the Amended 
Complaint and the comments 
attributed to me in the allegations 
are all true and were made without 
ill-will or rancor toward Mr. Eames 
and were made in good faith as fair 
comment on public interest issues." 
P.8 , In. 18: 
"A: Well, I think the 
impression one gets is that 
--of course, its easy to 
convict a person with 
conversation, and the 
impression one gets is that 
thereTs been some mis-
handling of funds, there!s 
been some misuse of 
property, you know, in re-
lation to the job, and that 
sort of thing, and its never 
been established that that!s 
true." 
P. 10 , In.17 : "Q: In your 
opinion, based upon your 
knowledge of Doug and the 
area here and being a long 
time resident, do you feel 
that — IT11 get the exact 
wording, too--do you feel 
that these statements going 
around impute to Doug the 
commission of a crime or 
degrade his character? 
A: Yes, I think they do." 
P.11 , 
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These contradictions were argued before the Judge (See 
addendum attached hereto) and in AppellantTs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss dated 9-5-84 (Pages 93-100 of the 
record). This alone puts the issue of defamation, if nothing 
else, in issue factually. 
This method of placing a question of fact in issue was 
recognized by this Court in the case of FRISBEE v. KftK 
CONSTRUCTION CD,, 676 P2d 387(1984) at pg. 390. This Court held: 
"However, it is not always required that the opposing party 
proffer affidavits in order to avoid judgment against him. Where 
moving affidavits shows on its face that there is a material issue 
of fact, summary judgment may not be entered, even if responsive 
affidavits are not filed." 
Appellant contends that at least one issue of fact is still 
in controversy, as is illustrated above, to wit: were the alleged 
statements, actions, and inactions attributed to Respondents, 
defamatory. Appellant argues that through innuendo Respondents* 
statements, actions and inactions created an impression of 
wrongdoing and or criminal activity on the part of Appellant and 
as such defamed Appellant. Appellant contends that this 
impression of wrongdoing or criminal activity exists in the minds 
of the citizens of the City of Logan, as is evidenced by the 
deposition of Dale O. Nelson, and as such Appellant has been 
defamed because these impressions are false. Respondents1 
response to these allegations and evidence are that the 
impressions of wrongdoing or criminal activity have a truthful 
basis. Thus it is clear on the face of this appeal that there is 
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at least one issue of fact to be tried. It is inherent in the 
nature of a defamation case that such a cause of action cannot and 
should not be disposed of summarily. Such a cause of action 
focuses on the light in which what one person says or does is 
perceived by others. A dispute of this nature cannot be resolved, 
at least factually, as this case exemplifies, on a summary basis 
without the Judge violating the rules of summary judgment set 
forth by this Court in the foregoing cases. 
III. The Court erred by abusing its discretion in that it 
went the parameters of a Motion for Summary Judgment and, in 
essence, tried Plaintiff's case on the merits as opposed to 
limiting its ruling to those issues appropriately before the Court 
on a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Under the guidelines set forth in the HOLBROOK and GARDNER 
cases cited above, the Court cannot "judge the credibility of the 
averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence." 
To do so is to clearly go beyond the guidelines of Summary 
Judgment and into the realm of deciding issues on their merits. 
The record of the District Court evidences that the trial judge 
entered this forbidden territory. Once again, referring to the 
trial court's 11/7/84 MEMORANDUM DECISION (Pages 109-110 of the 
record), when the Court stated: "The Court feels that such a 
statement does not give rise to any cause of action or defamation 
or any other relief asked for in the complaint. Nor do anyother 
actions or statements alleged to have been by the Mayor in the 
pleading give rise to any cause of action," it in essence stated 
that it was ruling on the credibility of the averments of the 
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parties, to wit: not believing the averments of the Appellant as 
contained in his Amended Complaint. This was in direct violation 
of the HOLBROOK guidelines, as set forth on page 193 of the 
HOLBROOK decision: "It is not the purpose of the summary judgment 
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties 
• • • • 
The trial court further perpetuated its error when it 
continued to state, in its 11/7/84 MEMORANDUM DECISION (Pages 109-
110 of the record): "Nor do anyother actions or statements alleged 
to have been by the Mayor in the pleading give rise to any cause 
of action." This evidences that the Court engaged in judging the 
credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence as is further 
forbidden by the HOLBROOK guidelines. 
IV. The trial court erred in that it did not view 
PlaintifPs pleadings and facts in a light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff and make a determination as to whether there were any 
material facts in dispute, as was required by established Utah 
case law . 
In the GARDNER case, previously cited, this Court, citing 
CONTROLLED RECEIVABLES, INC. v. HARMAN, 413 P2d 807,809 (1966), 
held: "This Court has characterized the motion for summary 
judgment as a 'harsh measure1 and therefore required that the 
opposing party's contentions be considered in a light most 
advantageous to him with all doubts resolved in favor of 
permitting him to go to trial." The record overwhelmingly 
evidences that the trial court did not adhere to this rule. The 
trial court's 11/7/84 MEMORANDUM DECISION (Pages 109-110 of the 
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record), which is the culmination of those portions of the record 
cited by Appellant thus far, clearly shows that the Court did not 
consider Respondents1 contentions in a light most advantageous to 
Appellant, resolving all doubts in favor of Appellant going to 
trial. By the trial court stating that: "The Court feels that 
such a statement does not give rise to any cause of action or 
defamation or any other relief asked for in the complaint. Nor do 
anyother actions or statements alleged to have been by the Mayor 
in the pleading give rise to any cause of action," the Court once 
again displays how it resolved disputed contention in favor of 
Respondents by granting Summary Judgment, as opposed to following 
the established guidelines by resolving all doubts in favor of 
permitting Plaintiff to go to trial. (W.W. AND W.B. GARDNER, INC, 
v, MANN, 680 P2d 23 (1984), pg. 24). 
V. The signing of the Order for Summary Judgment (Pages 111-
112 of the record) on 11-15-84, by the Judge, is manifest error in 
that the Order was improperly signed prior to the expiration of 
the five (5) day time limit set forth in rule 2.9(b) of the Rules 
of Practice of the District Courts. This contention points out, on 
its face, manifest error on the part of the trial Judge. The 
sequence of events leading up to this error are as follows: 
11-5-84 Oral arguments on Defendants1 Summary Judgment 
Motion. (Page 108 of the record) 
11-12-84 Certificate of Mailing (Page 112 of the 
record), certifying mailing of 
the Order for Summary Judgment on 11-12-84, 
signed by the secretary for Respondents1 
counsel. However, actual envelope that Order 
was mailed in shows mailing postmark of 
11-13-84. (See addendum attached hereto) 
11-15-84 Order for Summary Judgment received by 
13 
Plaint iff, and; 
Order for Summary Judgment signed by Judge. 
11-16-84 Preparation and mailing of Plaintiff's 
Objections to proposed Order for Summary 
Judgment (Pages 113-115 of the record) pursuant 
to Rule 2.9 of the Rules 
of Practice of the District Courts. 
12-6-84 Judge issues Memorandum Decision (Pages 119-120 
of the record) denying 
PlaintifPs Rule 2.9 objections. 
12-28-84 Order Denying Plaintiff's Objections to Order 
for Summary Judgment (Pages 121-122 of the 
record) signed by Judg.e. 
As can be seen, the signing of the Order for Summary Judgment 
(Pages 111-112 of the record) on 11-15-84, by the Judge, is 
manifest error in that the Order was improperly signed prior to 
the expiration of the five (5) day time limit set forth in rule 
2.9(b) of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts. Further, 
Rule 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure must be read in 
conjunction with Rule 2.9(b), thus precluding the Judge from 
signing the Order for Summary Judgment until the expiration of 
eight (8) days from the date of service of the Order on opposing 
counsel. In the case at bar, the earliest the Judge could have 
signed the Summary Judgment Order was on 11-18-84, under Rule 2.9, 
or 11-20-84, under Rule 2.9 in conjunction with U.R.C.P. 6(e). 
Thus the Order for Summary Judgment signed and entered by the 
Judge, and appealed from herein, is void and constitutes manifest 
reversible error. BIGELOW v. INGERSOLL, 618 P2d 50(1980) at pg. 
52. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons, both factual and legal, set forth in this 
brief, Appellant contends that the trial Judge erred by abusing 
his discretion and not following established legal guidelines in 
granting Respondents' Summary Judgment Motion. 
As such, Appellant prays that this Court reverse and set 
aside the trial court's Summary Judgment and remand the case to 
the District Court for trial on the merits, or such other relief 
as this Court deems appropriate under the circumstances. 
DATED this 29th day of Apri 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that they mailed four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, to: 
W. SCOTT BARRETT, Attorney 
BARRETT & BRADY 
300 South Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
on the 29th day of April, 1985. 
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ADDENDUM 
RULb,^  OF PRACTICE OF THE DISTRI^i' COURTS 
may request oral argument, and such request shall be granted unless the 
motion has been summanl) denied If no such request is made, oral 
argument shall be deemed to have been waived 
(0 Provided, however, that any District Court and any Circuit Court 
by order of the Judge or Judges of the court ma\ exclude that court from 
the operation of this rule 2 8 in which case an alternative procedure shall 
be prescnbed by written administrative order or rule. 
Rule 2.9 Written Orders, Judgments, and Decrees 
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining 
the ruling shall within fifteen (15) days, or within shorter time as the court 
may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in 
conformity with the ruling 
(b) Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, and/or Orders shall 
be served on opposing counsel before being presented to the court for 
signature unless the court otherwise orders Notice of objections thereto 
shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five (5) days after 
service 
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15) days of the 
settlement and dismissal 
Rule 2.10 Post Judgment Proceedings 
(a) Motions for supplemental orders and orders to show cause shall 
set forth the address of the party or parties to whom the order is issued 
and all orders to show cause and supplemental orders directed to people 
outside of the count\ within which the court is located shall contain the 
statement "Costs, if any, and mileage, if allowed, will be assessed at the 
hearing depending upon the merits " 
(b) Mileage, when allowed, will be computed at the same rate as 
mileage allowed to witnesses subpoenaed into such court 
(c) An\ such allowances may, at the discretion of the court, be ap-
plied as a credit upon the judgment involved in the proceedings, and 
when so allowed a written order to that effect shall be entered 
(d) In District Court mileage shall be allowed in all cases in which 
supplemental proceedings are based upon the docketing in the District 
Court of a judgment entered b\ an) District Circuit, or Justice Court 
located outside of the count) in which such judgment is docketed 
-6-
UTAH ivULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, k - u E 6 
(d) For Motions—Affidavits. A written motion, other than 
one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing 
thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before the time 
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by 
these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for cause 
shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is sup-
ported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; 
and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affi-
davits may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing, 
unless the court permits them to be served at some other time. 
(e) Additional Time After Service by Mail. Whenever a 
party has the right or is required to do some act or take some 
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a 
notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served 
upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
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BARRETT & BRADY 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
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L O G A N . U T A H 84321 
(801) 793-4000 
Attorneys for 
Defendants 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS EAMES 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF LOGAN, a Municipal 
Corp., NEWEL G. DAINES, in his 
individual and official 
capacity as Mayor of the City of 
Logan, Utah; DOES 1 thru 2 5 
individually, 
Defendants, 
ORDER FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 21426 
Defendants, Logan City and Newel G. Daines having heretofor 
filed a Motion to Dismiss and thereafter a Motion for Summary 
Judgment; and 
The Court having consolidated the Defendant's Motions as a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Counsel for Defendant having completed his discovery and 
presented to the Court his Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Defendant's Motion and 
Oral Argument having been held before the Court on the 5th 
day of November, 1984, and 
The Court having considered the Affidavits suomitted by the 
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Defendants and the pleadings, depositions submitted or argued to 
by the Plaintiff and all other papers and pleadings in the file, 
and the Court having rendered its Memorandum Decision on the 7th 
day of November 1984, and it further appearing that there is no 
genuine issue as to a material fact and that Defendants, the City 
of Logan, a Municipal Corporation and Newel G. Daines in his 
individual and official capacity as the Mayor of the City of 
Logan, are entitled to Judgment as a matter of law; therefore, 
It is Ordered that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
be, and the same hereby is, granted. 
DATED this day of , 1984. 
VeNoy Christofferson, District 
Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order For Summary Judgment to Elliot Levine, 
Attorney for the Plaintiff, 623 East First South, Salt Lake City, 
Ut^h, ^ 84102, f) postage prepaid this //) day of 
ty 4^1^ -TX 
Ranel1 Younker-sebretary 
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B A R R E T T & B R A D Y 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
3 0 0 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
P O BOX 4-65 
L O G A N , UTAH 3 4 3 2 1 
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Elliot Levme 
Attorney at Law 
623 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS EAMES, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
THE CITY OF LOGAN, A Municipal 
Corp., NEWELL G. DAINES, in 
his individual and Officeal 
Capacity as Mayor of the City 
of Logan, Utha; DOES 1 thru 25 
individually, 
Defendants 
Defendants having filed their Motion for Summary Judgment 
and the plaintiff having been given the opportunity to present 
all pertinent material they desire in connection with this motion 
and counsel for plaintiff having indicated he has provided all 
pertinent material conerning this motion and oral argument made 
before the Court, the Court now renders its decision on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
The first cause of action is for defamation based upon state-
ments made by the Mayor of Logan. The other three causes of action 
are based upon those same statements, whether they be for punitive 
damages or emotional distress. 
It is urged by the plaintiff that the statements made by the 
Mayor support the actions for defamation and that the statements 
are that there was an investigation of the plaintiff and a 
resultant termination. Comments by the Mayor that were published 
generally relate to the Mayor indicating that there was an 
administrative investigation concerning Mr. Eames. That Mr. Eames 
was terminated and the Mayor stated the administration was complete, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 21426 
no comment on any other investigation will be made by me or my office. 
It appears that what the plaintiff is complaining of is the 
statements by the Mayor that no comment on any other investigations 
will be made by me or my office. It apparently being the position 
of the plaintiff that this leaves up in the air what are the other 
investigations, and that this therefore alluding to other investigations 
defames the plaintiff and he is entitled to the relief he seeks in 
his first, second, third, and fourth cause of action. 
The Court feels that such a statement does not give rise to 
any cause of action or defamation or any other relief asked for in 
the complaint. Nor do anyother actions or statements alleged to 
have been made by the Mayor in the pleading give rise to any cause 
of action. 
Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Counsel for defendants to prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this ~7 tr\ day of November, 1984. 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS EAMES, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, a 
Municipal Corp., NEWEL G. 
DAINES, in his individual and 
Official Capacity as Mayor of 
the City of Logan, Utha, DOES 
1 thru 25, inclusivef 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 21426 
Plaintiff has filed an objection to the proposed order for 
summary judgment stating that the order contained in the judgment 
states: 
"It further appearing that there is no genuine issue as to 
material facts and that the defendant, the City of Logan, 
a Municipal Corporation, and Newel G. Daines, in his 
individual and official capacity as Mayor of the City of 
Logan, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Plaintiff considers this inaccurate as the memorandum decision 
did not directly use this exact wording but stated the statements 
made does not give rise to any cause of action of defamation or 
any relief asked for in the complaint, nor do any other actions 
or statements allege to have been made by the Mayor in the pleading 
give rise to any cause of action. Certainly the memorandum 
decision implies that there is no genuine issue as to the material 
facts and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
Such language will be incorporated by this memorandum decision 
in the previous memorandum decision, and any objections by the 
plaintiff are denied. 
Counsel for defendant to prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this Co ^i\ day of December, 1984. 
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Attorneys for 
IN
 THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS EAMES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, a 
Municipal Corporation; NEWEL 
G. DAINES, in his individual 
and official capacity as 
of the City of Logan, Utah; 
DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. 21426 
Defendants, the City of Logan, a Municipal Corporation, and 
Newel G. Daines, being the only Defendants served in this action, 
move the court for Summary judgment in their favor, pursuant to 
Rule 56(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground 
that there is no genuine issue of any material fact raised by 
the pleadings, and the moving parties are entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
This motion is based upon the papers and pleadings in the 
file; the Affidavit filed herewith, and the Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities heretofore submitted in connection with Defend-
ant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(e), and the further 
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supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted 
herewith. 
DATED th is /2. ti day of April, 1984. 
W. Scott Barrett 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS EAMES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, a 
Municipal Corporation; NEWEL 
G. DAINES, in his individual 
and official capacity as 
of the City of Logan, Utah; 
DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 21426 
The Supreme Court of Utah sent this action back after the 
Court's granting of a 12 B Motion to Dismiss. The sole reason 
given by the Supreme Court in its minutes was that since matters 
had been considered outside the record (counsel's oral argument 
were the only outside matters), the Plaintiff should have been 
given time to submit additional matter. 
To date, although the Plaintiff has taken two depositions, 
he has not submitted any motion asking for additional time. 
The previous Memorandum heretofore filed in support of the 
12 (B) Motion, are again referred to in connection with this Motion 
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for Summary Judgment, and incorporated h e r e i n by r e f e r e n c e . 
I 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A CLAIM AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SHOULD BE GRANTED AS TO LOGAN CITY AND MAYOR NEWEL G. DAINES. 
A Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in an action for 
defamation and invasion of privacy, cannot be overcome by 
assertion that there is a jury issue as to malice without show-
ing facts from which malice could be inferred. The constitu-
tional privilege of free expression is involved in libel actions 
and courts recognize the need for affording summary relief to 
a defendant. Summary Judgment must therefore be granted in 
defamation actions involving a public interest matter as soon 
as it becomes clear that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim. 
Meeropol v. Nizer, 508 F 2d 837, Cert. Den. 434 US 1013, 54 L.ed. 
2d 756. 
This action has been pending now for over a year, subjecting 
the Defendants to public questions and inquiries. The amount 
prayed for in the Complaint is clearly grossly excessive to the 
point of being frivolous. It is therefore time that Plaintiff be 
required to show that he has a claim, or pursuant to law, Summary 
Judgment should be granted. 
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment for the alleged 
defamation by a book reviewer constitute fair comment, and the 
plaintiff failed to set forth facts which warranted a trial of 
allegations that defendant was motivated by malice; plaintiff's 
claim against defendants is supported only by charges based 
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upon surmise, conjecture and suspicion. Guitar v. Westinghouse 
Electric, 538 F.2d 309. 
There is no doubt whatsoever that the firing of Mr. Eames 
was a matter of public interest. He was a public official as 
is the Mayor. 
In a libel action against a public official, summary 
judgment is granted to defendant where the plaintiff fails to 
raise a genuine issue as to actual malice by defendant. MacNiel 
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 66 FRD 22. 
The affidavit of Mayor Daines clearly shows that there is 
no genuine issue. This is a defamation action and must stand 
or fall on the alleged defamatory words. Not only are the words 
not defamatory as alleged, but the Mayor has asserted that they 
are true. 
A motion for summary judgment by a defendant may be 
predicated on the proposition that affirmative defenses to the 
complaint exist as a matter of law, and where precise language 
which is alleged to be slanderous is not identified in even 
general fashion, the complaint fails to comply with the require-
ments of setting forth a cause of action. Thompson v. Kiekhaefer 
(1976, DC WIS.) 71 FRD 115 
It is submitted that even if the plaintiff proved all that 
he has alleged in the Complaint, there is nothing to go to a jury, 
On a motion for summary judgment by defendant in a libel 
suit by a public figure, the plaintiff's version of the con-
tested facts is to be accepted and then examined in light of 
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the actual malice rule to see if the material facts are in 
dispute, and summary judgment for the defendant must be granted 
if the court is able to say that a jury could not reasonably 
find actual malice with convincing clarity. McManus v. 
Doubleday and Co., (1981 SDNY) 513 F. Supp. 1383. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that since Logan City is 
immune to defamatory action, pursuant to Section 63-30-3 of the 
Utah Code, and since Logan City is also immune from suit for 
matters arising out of the performance of a discretionary 
function, there is no genuine issue of any material fact, and 
the court should therefore grant summary judgment in favor of 
Logan City. A careful examination of the Amended Complaint 
indicates that the only claim made is one of defamation and 
damages arising therefrom. This issue is more fully treated in 
the Memorandum previously filed and incorporated herein. 
As the claim against Mayor Daines, it should be made 
clear that this is not a case for wrongful discharge. This 
fact has been admitted by the Plaintiff. 
As appears from the affidavit of Defendant Mayor Newel G. 
Daines, the action taken dismissing the Plaintiff, was done 
under the discretionary authority of the Mayor. He chose to 
dismiss Mr. Eames without cause, as he was permitted to do 
under state law. Mr. Eames has not at any time asked for a 
hearing, if in fact, he felt there was an "aura of suspicion" 
arising from his discharge. 
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It is respectfully submitted therefore that since Logan City 
is immume and any statements attributed to Mayor Daines are non-
defamatory, and, and in any event, too, that no claim has been 
stated against him, and there is not any genuine issue of any 
material fact for trial. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that Summary Judgment 
should be granted in favor of both named Defendants. 
DATED this April, 1984. 
-<s%AJ^3* 
W. Scott Barrett 
Attorney for Logan City and 
Mayor Newel G. Daines 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that true and accurate copies of the fore-
going Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, along with supporting Affidavit of Mayor 
Newel G. Daines, plus Motion for Summary Judgment, were mailed 
with postage prepaid, this f^ day of April, 1984, to: Elliott 
Levine, of Anderson & Holland, Attorney for the Plaintiff, at 623 
East First South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS EAMES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, a 
Municipal Corporation; NEWEL 
G. DAINES, in his individual 
and official capacity as 
of the City of Logan, Utah; 
DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 21426 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF CACHE ) 
Newel G. Daines, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
Q T ) That he is the duly elected Mayor of the City of 
Logan, Utah, a Municipal Corporation, and has served in that 
capacity continuously since January 5, 1982. 
(^ 2/ That prior to June 7, 1982, Plaintiff Douglas Eames 
was director of the Park Dept. for the City of Logan. Acting 
pursuant to my discretionary powers as Mayor of the City of Logan 
I terminated the employment of Mr, Eames, effective June 7, 1982. 
This termination was done pursuant to authority vested in me by 
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state law, and was done without cause as permitted by state law, 
since Mr, Eames was a department head. This action was unani-
mously approved by the Logan City Municipal Council. 
3. Mr. Eames at no time requested any hearing, and I 
did not publicize the termination in any manner whatsoever, 
except to answer questions from newspaper reporters who called. 
I advised them only that the discharge was without cause. The 
media interest in the matter of Mr. Eames' suspension and dis-
charge was not initiated by me. 
f47y That I have never at any time publicized any reasons 
rfor the termination of Mr. Eames, and in particular, I have never 
stated publicly or published any statement about Mr. Eames that 
was false or that could in any way be construed as injurious to 
the reputation, name or calling of Mr. Eames. 
\5f I have read the Amended Complaint and the comments 
attributed to me in the allegations are all true and were 
made without any ill-will or rancor toward Mr. Eames and were 
made in good faith as fair comment on public interest issues. 
6. I certify that the facts stated herein are made on 
my personal knowledge and that I am competent to testify to the 
matters stated herein. 
DATED this I *• day of April, 1984. 
Newel G. Dames 
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1984. 
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Notary Public 
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ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
ELLIOTT LEVINE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
623 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8^102 
Telephone: (801 )363-9J1»5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS EAMES, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, a \ 
Municipal Corporation; NEWEL 
G. DAINES, in his Individual 
and Official Capacity as Mayor 
of the City of Logan, Utah; DOES 
1 through 25, Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
) AMENDED COMPLAINT 
) CIVIL NO. 21426 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through his attorney 
of record, ELLIOTT LEVINE, and for his causes of action 
against the Defendants alleges as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1* That, at all times referred to herein, until June 
7, 1982, Plaintiff was employed by the CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH 
as the Director of the Parks Department; That, at all times 
referred to herein, Plaintiff was and is presently a 
resident of the City of Logan, County of Cache, State of 
tt&n -
2. That the Defendant, CITY OF LOGAN, was, at all 
times referred to herein, and is presently a Municipal 
Corporation organized under the appropriate laws and 
constitutional provisions of the State of Utah. 
3. That the Defendant, CITY OF LOGAN, pursuant to 
its charter and ordinances, vests its administrative duties, 
including the firing and hiring of the city's department 
heads, in the Mayor; That, at all times referred to herein, 
and at the present time, Defendant, NEWEL G. DAINES was 
and is the elected Mayor of the CITY OF LOGAN. 
4 • The true names and/or capacities of the defendants 
named herein as DOES 1 THROUGH 25, INCLUSIVE, are presently 
unknown to the Plaintiff at this time and as such Plaintiff 
sues said Defendants by such fictitious names, however, 
reserves the right to amend this COMPLAINT, in accordance 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to show said 
Defendants1 true names and capacities when such knowledge 
is obtained. 
5. That, at all times mentioned herein, the Defendant, 
NEWEL G* DAINES, was acting under color of his title as 
Mayor of the Defendant CITY OF LOGAN* 
6* That between the dates of approximately May 4, 
1932 and up until the present time, the Defendants, outside 
the scope of any public meetings, official administrative 
hearings, court proceedings, or within the general scope 
of their duties, made various comments and statements 
directed to the general public, engaged in actions which 
were reported to the public, and engaged in conduct and 
activities highly visible to the general public, which, 
when taken together during the aforementioned puriod of 
time, charged the Plaintiff with dishonesty, had a tendency 
to injure the Plaintiff in his occupation and trade, imputed 
the Plaintiff with committing criminal offenses, as well 
as carrying on suspect and irregular activities and 
practices while in the employment of the City of Logan, 
Utah. To wit: 
a) On or about Hay 4, 1982, Mayor Daines 
commenting to the Herald Journal (Logan, Utah): §Referring 
to the Willow Park Zoot "But it has grown like top seed 
and has become too burdensome to Logan City." 
b) May 11, 1982 letter from Mayor Daines to 
Plaintiff: "I hereby appoint Lyle Negus as acting head of 
the Parks Department pending completion of the investigation 
of the affairs in the Park Department*'1 
c) May 11, 1982 comment of Mayor Daines appearing 
in the Herald Journal (Logan, Utah): "The investigation 
should not imply that Eames is being accused of criminal 
activity, Daines said» The City will be looking into how 
the park § Willow Park Zoot has been administered, not 
looking for criminal impropriety*••.Daines said he feels 
that Eames1 enthusiam for the zoo has gotten out of hand 
and thereis no one who is coordinating its growth*11 
d) May 18, 1982 Associated Press wire story: 
" D a i r i e s s a i d i n f o r m a t i o n had come t o h i s a t t e n t i o n t h a t 
w a r r a n t e d fan a d m i n i s t r a t i v e review* 
e ) Page 6 of t h e 1982-19 8 3 Budge t Message f o r 
t h e C i t y o f Logan by Mayor D a i n e s : " A f t e r s i x m o n t h s 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i t seems p r u d e n t , wi th our l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s , 
t o d e c r e a s e f u n d i n g o f t h e z o o i n t h e W i l l o w P a r k 
Complex • • • .Our t ime and funds should be expended t-o upgrade 
t h e p i c n i c and p l a y g r o u n d f a c i l i t i e s * Our p e r s p e c t i v e has 
been c louded by Mr. Eames1 enthusiasm*." 
f ) J u n e 7 , 1982 Memorandum from Mayor D a i n e s 
• * 
to the Plaintiff: "Douglas Eames has been terminated as 
Director of the Logan Parks Department and is discharged 
from city employment effective immediately. The 
administrative investigation is complete* No comment on 
j^ ny other investigation will be made by me o^ rny nffjpn-
This termination is with the knowledge of the Municipal 
council members." 
— - ^ S) June 8, 1982 comments in the Herald Tribune 
(Logan, Utah) by Mayor Dairies: "fThe administrative 
investigation is complete,1 Daines said in a terse news 
release. fNo comment on any other investigation will be 
made by me or my office....1" And comments by Logan Police 
Department Detective Richard Wright: "Wright said Eames 
knows why the Mayor and the police have been looking iryt£ 
the operation of the parks and the Willow Park Zoo**«-When 
asked if the city will bring charges this time, Wright said 
he is fnoi ruling out anything at this point.1" And further 
comments appearing in this article by James Thaiman: "Even 
though no reasons have publicly been made, accusations 
againsi Eames of being a poor administrator and of 
questionable activities in handling animals at the zoo have 
surfaced • " 
h) June 9, 1982 article appearing in^the Salt 
Lake Tribune: "Walhlstrora said he's not well acquainted 
with Eames, but recognizes Eames has a lot of friends and 
has done an energetic job for the city* ?It seems that 
sometimes an overly energetic person oversteps his bounds 
and this may have been what the mayor felt happened,1 
Wahlstrom said." 
i) July 16, 1932 article appearing in the Herald 
Tribune (Logan, Utah): "Daines plan calls for parks and 
recreation director, with a parks manager and recreation 
manager. The zoo curator and cemetery sexton would report 
directly to the parks manager.•.»fThere's a good deal of 
balance with this type of administrative set-up,' Daines 
told the council* 'I think it would work well* I think 
this will save a significant amount of money and better 
utilize the personnel*f" 
j) July 21, 19&2 article appearing m the Cache 
Citizen: "Eames was fired by Logan Mayor Newel Daines in 
the midst of a police investigation which he ordered to 
search out alleged miscouduct in the park's department. 
After sacking Eames the mayor declined to say why noting 
that the investigation was continuing with the possibility 
that the findings could be turned over to the county 
attorney for possible legal action. That was several weeks 
ago. Eames said he hasnft been told anything since the 
firing about the investigation• He was placed on a leave 
of absence during part of the investigation prior^to being 
sacked* The Citizen contacted Logan Police chief Ferris 
Groli Monday who said he was briefed about a week ago by 
the detective looking into the matter- 'He was esentiaily 
finished,1 Groll said. f He didn't see that there were going 
to be too many problems,' he added, indicating the detective 
had found little to forward to the county attorney- Some 
of ihe records were a little hard to find, Groll said. 
And the detective is waiting for a few other records yet 
to be inspected." 
7 • That the foregoing words and actions of the 
Defendants were printed in various newspapers throughout 
the City of Logan, Cache County, Utah, and Salt Lake County, 
Utah; Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants' words and 
actions were printed and transmitted by the wire services 
and as such appeared throughout various newspapers and other 
publications throughout the United States* 
§• Said defamatory matter wac, and is, false ~nd was 
known by Defendants to be false when made and was published 
with actual malice and with the wrongful, wilful, wanton 
i n t e r ) i, of i n j u r i n g p l a i n t i f f , m o t i v a t e d by t h e e x i s t e n c e 
of f e e l i n g s of h a t r e d , i l l - w i l l , j e a l o u s y , and d i v e r s e 
p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b e l i e f s toward the f i r * ~; rr 
and wi l l i t h e d e s i . r u l o o p p r e s s the P l a i n t i f f and f o r c e him 
i n i o r e s i g n a t i o n from h i s p o s i t i o n a s D i r e c t o r of P a r k s 
fo r Ine C i ty of Logan* 
9* As a d i r e c t and p rox ima te r e s u l t of t h e d'efamatory 
s t a t e m e n t s , P l a i n t i f f h a s been e x p o s e d t o p u b l i c contempt 
and r i d i c u l e . F u r t h e r , s a i d s t a t m e n t s and a c t i o n s have 
b e e n a s o u r c e o f e m b a r r a s s m e n t and h u m i l i a t i o n t o t h e 
P l a i n t i f f c a u s i n g t h e P l a i n t i f f t o s u f f e r men ta l d i s t r e s s 
and a n g u i s h f o r which P l a i n t i f f s h o u l d be awarded damages 
in t h e amount of $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
10# As a d i r e c t and p rox ima te r e s u l t of s a i d de famatory 
s t a t e m e n t s , P l a i n t i f f l o s t h i s p o s i t i o n w i t h t h e C i ty of 
L o g a n , U t a h , and h a s been unemployed s i n c e h i s t e r m i n a t i o n 
on J u n e 7 , 1982 , h i s f u t u r e p r o s p e c t s of employment were 
m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t e d and pe rmanen t ly l e s s e n e d and d e c r e a s e d . 
P l a i n t i f f had an e x p e c t a n c y of r e t a i n i n g h i s p o s i t i o n , wi th 
t h e C i t y of L o g a n , U t a h , f o r some t i m e in t h e f u t u r e but 
f o r t h e d e f a m a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s a n d c o n d u c t by t h e 
D e f e n d a n t s . By r ea son of t h e f o r e g o i n g , P l a i n t i f f has been 
f u r t h e r damaged in t he sum of $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
1 1 . S i n c e s a i d d e f a m a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s and c o n d u c t by 
D e f e n d a n t s w e r e w i l f u l , m a l i c i o u s , and i n t e n t i o n a l , 
P l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r e x e m p l a r y and p u n i t i v e 
damages in the amount of $10,000,000.00. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
12# Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by 
reference those allegations set forth under paragraphs 1, 
through and including, 8 under his First Cause of Action, 
above, as though set forth in haec verba* 
13* Said defamatory statements were.made maliciously, 
without any justification, and with wilful intent to injure 
Plaintiff* As a result Plaintiff suffered a loss in his 
earning capacity as well as having his pension and 
retirement benefits impaired. Further, Plaintiff was 
injured in his good name and reputation and has suffered 
great personal discomfort all to his damage in the amount 
of $10,000,000*00. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
14* Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by 
reference those allegations set forth above, under his 
Second Cause of Action, as though set forth in haec verba* 
15* That Defendants1 actions constituted extreme and 
outrageous conduct on their part* 
16* That Defendants1 actions were carried out with 
the intent of causing Plaintiff severe emotional distress 
to a degree that he would be forced into resigning from 
his position as the Director of Parks for the City of Logan 
and, further, to stifle Plain tiff's opposition to the 
Defendants1 administrative policies regarding the operation 
of the City's Parks Department and in particular, the Willow 
Park Zoo, 
17* As a d i r e c t and p rox ima te r e s u l t of s a i d a c t i o n s , 
P l a i n t i f f h a s been damaged i n t h a t he has s u f f e r e d s e v e r e 
e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s , s l e e p l e s s n i g h t s , and a l o s s o f 
c o n f i d e n c e and s e l f - e s t e e m . 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
18* P l a i n t i f f r e a l l e g e s and i n c o r p o r a t e s h e r e i n by 
r e f e r e n c e t h o s e a l l e g a t i o n s s e t f o r t h above under h i s F i r s t , 
S e c o n d , and T h i r d C a u s e s of A c t i o n s , a s t h o u g h s e t f o r t h 
in haec verba* 
19- T h a t D e f e n d a n t s 1 a c t i o n s r e s u l t e d i n a s e r i o u s 
and u n r e a s o n a b l e i n v a s i o n of t h e P i a i n t i f f T s r i g h t of 
p r i v a c y . 
2 0 . D e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s c r e a t e d widespread p u b l i c i t y 
which p l a c e d t h e P l a i n t i f f and h i s r e p u t a t i o n i n a f a l s e 
l i g h t w i t h i n h i s community* 
2 1 . As a r e s u l t of D e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s , P l a i n t i f f 
h a s s u f f e r e d severe e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s and menta l a n g u i s h 
a n d a s a r e s u l t h a s b e e n d a m a g e d i n t h e sum o f 
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
2 2 . The words and a c t i o n s of t h e D e f e n d a n t s , which 
p r o j e c t e d P l a i n t i f f i n a f a l s e l i g h t , were p r i n t e d i n 
v a r i o u s newspapers t h r o u g h o u t t h e C i t y of Logan, Utah, Cache 
C o u n t y , U t a h , a n d S a l t L a ke C o u n t y , U t a h ; t h a t t h e 
a f o r e a l l e g e d i n v a s i o n s of p r i v a c y w e r e * d o n e w i t h m a l i c e 
and r e s u l t e d because of t h e e x i s t e n c e of f e e l i n g s of h a t r e d , 
ill-will, jealousy, and diverse political and administrative 
beliefs between the Defendants and Plaintiff and thus the 
awarding of exemplary and punitive damages in the amount 
of $10,000,000*00 is justified*. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally as 
follows: 
1. Under Plaintiff's First Cause of Action: 
a* For damages in the sum of $10,000,000.00; 
b. For exemplary and punitive damages in the 
sum of $10,000,000-00; 
2. Under Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action: 
a. For damages in the sum of $10,000,000*00* 
b* For exemplary and punitive damages in the 
sum of $10,000,000-00. 
3« Under Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action: 
a* For damages in the sum of $10,000,000*00* 
b. For exemplary and punitive damages in the 
sum of $10,000,000*00. 
4. Under Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action: 
a. For damages in the sum of $10,000,000.00* 
b* For exemplary and punitive damages in the 
sum of $10,000,000.00. 
5* Under each cause of action for costs of suit herein 
incurred; 
6. Under each cause of action for such other and 
further relief as the Court deems appropriate under the 
circumstances* 
DATED this 10th day of June, 1933-
ANDERSON & HOL 
Plaintiff's Address: 
915 Park Ave* 
Logan, Utah 84321 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED hereby certifies that they mailed the 
original of the forgoing AMENDED COMPLAINT, postage.prepaid, 
to: 1st District Court Clerk, Cache County, 160 North Main, 
Logan, UT 84321, and a true and correct copy of. the 
foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT, postage prepaid, to: Scott 
Barrett, Attorney for Defendants, 120 North 100 West, Logan, 
UT 84321, on this 10th day of June, 1983-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
DOUGLAS EAMES, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
THE CITY OF LOGAN, et al., 
Defendants, 
CIVIL NO. 21426 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
OF PROCEEDINGS 
ARGUMENTS ON DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT held in the above-entitled court and cause on the 
fifth day of November, 1984, commencing at 2:20 o'clock p.m., 
before the Hon. VeNoy Christoffersen, District Judge, pre-
siding. 
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ELLIOTT LEVINE, ESQ. 
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Logan, Utah 84321 
GEORGE A. PARKER 
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208 Hall of Justice 
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4
 THE COURT: This is Eames vs. the City of Logan, 
5 et a.!., in which there was a request for oral argument. I 
6 assume that all discovery and all pleadings and answers and 
7 responses have been filed; is that correct? 
8 MR. BARRETT: Correct. 
9 MR. LEVINE: On behalf of the plaintiff, yes, to 
10 this time. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. So now there just remains your 
12 oral argument and how you want that related to whatever you 
13 ™ aY have filed and what depositions may have been taken. 
14 MR. LEVINE: That's correct, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Barrett. 
16 MR. BARRETT: Your Honor, after this matter was 
17 sent back on I think what we all recognize as a technicality, 
18 the plaintiff noticed fifteen depositions. Thirteen of them 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
were taken, two people didn't show up, not having been sub-
poenaed, and now in defense to the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, only one of these thirteen depositions is 
even referred to by the plaintiff, and that's the deposition 
of a cousin, who admits—a cousin of the plaintiff—who 
admits he really knows nothing except the rumors he's heard 
and what he's read in the paper. 
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The defendants have filed an affidavit in support 
of motion for summary judgment, which I think is dispositive 
really as far as the Mayor, Newell Daines, is concerned. 
There are no counter affidavits of any kind on file, contrary 
to the requirements of Rule 56. The only defense the 
plaintiff attempts to raise to the defendants motion for 
summary judgment is that somehow Logan City should not have 
government immunity to a defamatory action as the lav; clearly 
says in the State Code, because, as now, the plaintiff, 
contends for the first time in letting Mr. Eames go the City 
of Logan was acting in a proprietary capacity. 
Well, I think the court will recognize that this 
is nonsense. Personnel in the municipal are not proprietary 
but are governmental. 
When Mr. Levine was asking for additional time to 
take more depositions, he filed an affidavit dated April 22, 
1934, saying that he couldn't defend against defendant's 
notions because all of the information of alleged wrongdoings 
was in the possession df the defendants. So now he's taken 
all the depositions that he wants to take and has come up witlji 
absolutely nothing to show that there is any claim that he 
can state against the City or the Mayor. 
It's therefore submitted that nothing has changed 
since our first motion, which was granted by the court, ard 
that the position of the defendants is indeed stronger with. 
1 an affidavit on file, additional memoranda filed, fifteen 
2 depositions noticed, thirteen taken, nothing to add to the 
3 allegations of the complaint, which are only in general terms 
4 and which do not state a claim. So we, therefore, submit 
5 that summary judgment should be granted. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Levine. 
7 MR. LEVINE: Your Honor, I think about the only 
8 thing that we agree upon as to what's before the court today 
9 is a motion for summary judgment. First of all, I would like 
10 to point out that as a motion for summary judgment we must 
n apply the civil procedure rules and the rules of law and case 
t2 law regarding summary judgment. Those rules and law are 
13 referred on page 5"o£ my memorandum in opposition to the 
14 motion to dismiss. 
15 In particular I'd like to point out the case of 
16 Holbrook Company vs. Adams, at 542 P2d 191, a 1975 Utah case. 
17 I seem to have omitted that cite from the quote that I took, 
18 but what it says, what the case says is that it is not the 
19 purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the 
20 credibility of the averments of the parties, or witnesses, 
21 or the weight of evidence. Neither is it to deny parties 
22 the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. 
23 Its purpose is to eliminate the time, trouble, and expense 
24 of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted 
25 by the party ruled against he would not be entitled to 
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prevail. Only when it so appears is the court justified in 
refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting his 
evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to his 
views. Conversely, if there is any dispute as to any issue, 
material to the settlement of the controversy, the summary 
judgment should not be granted. 
Based on that premise, Your Honor, we must now 
look at the pleadings under these summary judgment rules. 
The amended complaint contains four causes of action. The 
first cause of action, defamation— 
THE COURT: Now are you talking about the amended 
one? 
MR. LEVINE: Yes, Your Honor, the amended one. 
THE COURT: Let me find that so I know what you're 
talking about. 
MR. LEVINE: All right. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now where are you referring now? 
MR. LEVINE: Okay. To our first cause of action. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LEVIN: The first cause of action in the 
amended complaint is for defamation; second cause of action, 
what we would categorize as injurious falsehood; third cause 
of action, intentional infliction of emotional distress; and 
fourth cause of action, what we would term invasion of 
privacy. 
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1 As to the second, third and fourth causes of 
2 action, nothing has been put forth by the defendants in any 
3 of their pleadings to dispel, counter, or negate either 
4
 factually or legally those causes of actions or the averments 
5 contained therein. Therefore, those causes of actions, 
6
 two, three;?and four, must stand as is and cannot be defeated 
M by a summary judgment motion, 
8 The only cause of action which defendants attempt 
9 to bombard is the first cause of action for defamation* As 
10 to the first cause of action it is our position that there 
11 are genuine issues as to fact and law as follows: The main 
12 question is questions of fact and law as to whether the 
13 statements of the Mayor and/or Richard Wright were defamatory 
*
4
 They say no, we say yes. 
15 our position, our affirmative position that they 
16 are defamatory, is based upon basically the comments which 
*
7
 were delineated in paragraph—excuse me, on pages 3 and 4 of 
18
 the amended complaint, which is paragraph 6 of the complaint. 
19 In specific I'm referring to subparagraph (b), (f), and (g) 
20 of the complaint. Paragraph 6 of the complaint. 
21 in all of those instances—and it is not denied 
22
 even by the affidavit of the Mayor, that those statements 
23 were made regarding an investigation. Paragraph 6(b), to 
24
 J the effect, and I quote in part—well, I'll read this in 
full: "I hereby appoint Lyle Negus as acting head of the 25 
-7-
1
 Parks Department pending completion of the investigation of 
2
 affairs in the Parks Department." 
3
 THE COURT: Now this is subparagraph (d)? 
4
 MR. LEVINE: Excuse me, this is sub (b). 
5
 THE COURT: Okay. 
6
 MR. LEVINE: Okay. And I might point out that all 
7
 of these—that that first sub (b) was in a letter from Mayor 
8 Daines -to the plaintiff, Mr. Eames, which was later published 
9
 and became public knowledqe. 
10 Subparagraph (f), the June 7, 1982, memorandum from 
n Mayor Daines to the plaintiff, which again was published: 
12 "Douglas Eames has been terminated as Director of the Logan 
13 Parks Department and is discharged from City employment 
14 effective immediately. The administrative investigation is 
15 complete. No comment on any other investigation will be made 
16 by me or my office. This termination is with the knowledge 
17 of the Municipal Council members." And I add emphasis to 
18
 that part of that memorandum which says, "Mo comment on any 
19 other investigation will be made by me or my office.11 
20
 Subparagraph (g) , June 8, 1982, comments in the 
21
 Herald Tribune (Logan, Utah) by Mayor Daines: "'The admini-
strative investigation is complete/1 Daines said in a terse 
23
 nevvs release. 'Mo comment on any other investigation will be 
24
 made by me or my office....1" And comments by Logan Police 
25
 Department Detective Richard Wright: "Wright said Eames 
-8-
knows why the Mayor and the police have been looking into the 
operation of the parks and the Willow Park Zoo. When asked 
if the City will bring charges this tine/ Wright said he is 
'not rulirg out anything at this point.1" 
As you can see from those comments, there is a 
definite, specific reference macfe to other investigations. 
Our whole contention is that these references to other 
investigations fall within the gambit of defamation. They 
definitely put Mr. Eames's character in question, his reputa-
tion in question. "What went on?" 
Well, the whole question here—and the defendants 
kind of play these back and forth and get them confused; we 
have no qualms with their assertion that the Mayor had the 
right to fire Mr. Eames. We have no qualms with that. What 
we're talking about is the way in which he went about firing 
Mr. Eames. What we're talking about is the comments made 
pursuant to the firing and termination, the way the matter 
was handled subsequent to that. There's right way to 
terminate somebody and wrong way to terminate somebody. The 
wrong way, which we allege they terminated Mr. Eames, resulte<jl 
in defamation, and that's the whole key issue in this case 
that we're asserting. 
As to our discovery—and we did take a lot of 
depositions, but under the rules for summary judgment we 
don't have to prove our whole case today. We only need to 
-9-
rely on those items v/hich we feel show the court that there 
are genuine issues of fact and law; and to carry it further 
I refer to the deposition, the deposition of Richard Wright, 
which was taken on the 19th of March, 1984, and in specific 
page 4. 
MR. BARRETT: I'm going to object to Mr. Levine 
referring to anything he hasn't already submitted to the 
court. I think the rules require that any affidavits in 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment must be on file 
before the hearing. 
MR. LEVINE: I'm not talking about affidavits, I'm 
talking about depositions that were filed with the court, 
and I would— 
THE COURT: That's what I'm looking at. I don't 
have that one. 
MR. LEVINE: Okay. I have a popy here if Your 
Honor would like to look at it. 
THE COURT: Well, do you plan on filing one? 
MR. LEVINE: It was my understanding that they all 
were filed with the court. 
THE CLERK: I brought everything we had in there. 
THE COURT: I have the deposition of Dale Nelson, 
Joseph Sheen, Edward Dowd, and that's all that we have filed. 
MR. LEVINE: Okay. I'll check into that and find 
out what the status of that is, but it was my understanding 
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that they had all been filed with the court, but I'll check 
on that and I'll leave it up to the court's discretion 
whether the court wants me to refer to Mr. Wright's deposi-
tion. 
THE COURT: Well, in your argument you may refer 
to it, certainly. 
MR. LEVINE: Okay. 
THE COURT: And if I feel it has any relevance, of 
course, I'd have to see the deposition first. 
MR. LEVINE: Okay. Page 4 of Mr- Wright's deposi-
tion, and beginning at line 20: (Reading) 
"Q Do you do just criminal investigations or civil 
investigat ions? 
"A I don't do civil investigations. Criminal investi-
gations. n 
Then we turn over to page 11 of Mr. Wright's 
deposition, Richard Wright's deposition, line 10: (Reading) 
"Q Has the investigation that you are handling 
regarding Doug Eames been closed or is it still open? 
MA It is still open. 
HQ How long do you anticipate that it will remain 
open? 
WA I have no idea. I suppose when the statute of 
limitations would run, which is about four years, I believe." 
And then at the bottom of page 11: (Reading) 
-11-
1 ,fQ What status is Doug Eames's case assigned? Is it 
2 suspended right now? 
3 "A Well, I consider it still open, an active case." 
4
 Page 12: (Reading) 
5 "Q Are you still gathering information and checking 
6 leads? 
7 "A Yes.11 | 
8 I think the court can see from that that that j 
9 substantiates our allegations in that when the Mayor made 
10 those statements there was an active investigation going on, 
11 and I think that definitely creates after all of this time— 
12 we are talking about over two years later; there's still an 
13 investigation that's open, information being gathered. 
14 What's it about? What's happening? This is not an inquisi-
15 tion. We're past that era of law. People have to be given 
16 answers. 
17 Also referring to the deposition of Dale O. Nelson, 
18 pages 8 and 9. I will start with page 8, line 14: 
19 "Q Well, just—you know, truthfully, what kind of 
20 impression you get from everything that's going on as 
21 basically a resident of the City of Logan. That's basically 
22
 what I'm trying to get. 
23 "A Well, I think the impression that one gets is that, 
24
 of course, it's easy to convict a person with conversation, 
25
 I and the impression that one gets is that there's an investi-
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gation going on, that there's been some mismanagement of 
funds, there's been some misuse of property, you know, in 
relationship to the job, and that sort of thing, and it's 
never been established that that's true." 
Over on page 9, line 1: (Reading) 
"It's a little bit annoying to me as a citizen to see 
those kinds of allegations and not to have any substantiation 
from investigations or otherwise, and I've never seen that, 
I've never heard it so, you know, a person would be a little 
bit disturbed at not having better information, and yet the 
implication is that somebody's not doing the right thing as 
far as the job is concerned." 
I think that definitely puts in issue, both issues 
of fact and law, as to the defamation question. Mr. Nelson, 
whatever his status, even his cousin or whatever, he's a 
citizen of Logan and he's entitled to give his opinion. That 
question and answer was never objected to in the deposition 
on any grounds, Your Honor. So, therefore, I say as to the 
defamation issue on that basis alone there's enough to put 
this matter both legally and factually at issue. 
Another issue which I say is in fact—excuse me; 
another legal and factual issue which is present at this time 
and must, therefore, go to trial are the statements set forth 
in paragraph 6(a) through (j) of the complaint, part of which 
I just referred to. The amended complaint. 
- 1 3 -
1
 THF COURT: You're s t i l l t a l k i n g about the f i r s t 
2 , 
cause of action? 
3 |
 MR. LEVINE: Right. First cause of action. Those 
4 , 
are the subparagraphs (a) through— 
5 1
 THE COURT: Are you talking about (h), (i) , and (j) 
6
 • 
now? 
7
 MR. LEVINE: No, I'm talking about—I guess all 
8 
1
 of paragraph 6. 
9
 ' THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. LEVINE: But specifically subparagraphs (a) 
11
 'through (j), which in the amended complaint came about becaus^ 
1
 'the court required that we specify what we were referring to 
13 
when we talked about defamation, so we set forth in (a) 
14 I 
through (.j) these specific instances, and what I determine as 
15 . i 
a fact between the court, before the court, which is at issue J 
what 
16 I , 
the defendants say that—/they try and do is take every 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
separate incident independently and say, "Mo, that's not 
defamation, no, that's not defamation, (b) is not defamation, 
(c) is not defamation." 
Our position on that is that you have to take the 
whole sequence of events, the whole circumstances into con-
sideration. You can't put this on the chopping block and 
take it part by part. We're talking about a continuing 
defamation, and you have to talk about a time period beginning 
when Mr. Eames was terminated up until the present when an 
-14 
1 investigation is supposedly still going on, some two or two 
2 and a half years later, and that is at issue before the 
3 court. 
4 Are each one of these incidents supposed to be 
5 taken separately or are we supposed to look at the totality 
6 of circumstances, which is what we assert is what the law 
7 says? 
8 There is also a question or law as to the status 
9 J of the parties involved. Are we talking about public figures 
or private figures? It depends on at what point in time 
we're looking at. At one time Mr. Eames could possibly be 
considered—and it's a legal detemination—a public figure, 
but was he a private figure when he was suspended? That's 
an issue of law for the court to determine, and it has 
15 direct bearing on the first cause of action in that based 
16 J upon the status of the parties it limits certain defenses 
that are available to the defendants. There are also 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
17 
18 J questions of law as to the defenses applicable to the 
defendants. Are they entitled to the fair comment defense, 
are they entitled to the truth defense? What other defenses 
are they entitled to? These are questions of law which only 
22 I come about at a trial when the court determines what the 
23 J status of the parties are involved in this matter. 
The other question of law and fact which we assert 
19 
20 
21 
24 
25 is presently at issue and is not resolved by the pleadings 
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on their face is the defendant's assertion that Utah Code 
Annotated Section 63-30-10 et sec is applicable in this 
matter, and referring to ny memorandum it's our position 
that the injuries resulted from a decision at an operational 
level. Those matters which concern routine, everyday 
matters, and is not a governmental function. Thus it's out-
side of the scope of 63-30-10(a) and 63-30-10(3) and the 
Governmental immunity Act as a whole. 
The actions which caused the injuries complained 
of were not as a result of the exercise and discharge of a 
governmental function but were, if anything, the result of 
the exercise of a proprietary function and are thus not 
subject to governmental immunity. It's not the firing, 
once again, of Mr. Eames, but the way in which it was carried! 
out, the comments made pursuant to the termination and 
firing, and the stage set by the .Mayor and/or Richard Wright 
vis-a-vis their comments and conduct and course of investiga-j 
tion. And those actions, those statements made do not fall 
within the purview of governmental immunity. 
Therefore, it's our position that the motion for 
summary judgment should be denied. 
Further, the affidavit of the Mayor adds nothing 
to this matter. The first three paragraphs we have no 
problem with. They have no bearing at all on this case. 
Paragraphs 4 and 5 are merely legal conclusions, what I 
4 
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1
 I assert are legal conclusions by the Mayor. They are self-
2
 I serving legal conclusions. There's no way that we can 
3j contradict those. I mean the Mayor says in paragraph 4, 
"I have never at any time publicized any reasons for the 
5
 I termination of Mr. Eames, and in particular I have never 
6
 stated publicly or published any statement about Mr. Eames 
7
 that was false or that could in any way be construed as 
8 injurious to the reputation, name, or calling of Mr. Eames." 
9
 That's a legal conclusion. That's fine. That's 
10 J the Mayor's view, but that's a legal question that has to be 
answered either by the court or by a jury at trial. 
Paragraph 5 is the same. Paragraph 5 says, "I 
have read the amended complaint and the comments attributed 
to me in the allegation"—excuse me. Let me start over. 
Paragraph 5: "I have read the amended complaint and the 
comments attributed to me and. the comments attributed to me 
in the allegations are all true and were made without any ill 
will or rancor toward Mr. Eames or made in good faith as fair 
comment on public interest issues." 
Well, that's fine, but once again it's self-
serving. What the Mayor is trying to do is say that the 
statements were true and, therefore, he's setting up the 
23
 ] truth defense and that he was merely making fair comment on 
public interest issues. Well, that's fine, but there's been 
no determination that this is a public interest issue. That' 
n 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
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10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
another matter that has to be determined, a legal matter 
that has to be determined by the court or jury at trial. 
It's nice that the Mayor says that, but, as I said, it's 
strictly self-serving and a legal conclusion. 
That's the reason why we didn't feel it's necessary 
to respond to this affidavit, because it doesn't add any-
thing of substance to any of the issues in the case and, 
8
 [ therefore, it's our feeling that based upon our argument, 
all the pleadings, the depositions that we referred to, 
which I feel are all that are needed at this point in time, 
there are definite issues of fact and law which must go to 
the jury or Your Honor at a trial, I don't think this 
matter is subject to summary judgment motion based upon 
those grounds, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Maybe I could ask you a couple of 
questions in regard to it. 
MR. LEVINE: Sure. 
THE COURT: Generally your causes of action, both 
the first, the second and the third and fourth, the first 
one being defamation, your second cause of action being for 
punitive damages, alleging that it was willful and mali-
cious; your third cause of action alleging that based on 
the same statements you allege in your first cause of action^ 
that this caused emotional distress and raised an additional 
cause of action because of the emotional distress; and your 
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fourth cause of action, based upon the same things, the same 
2 
statements you allege were made in the first cause of action, 
3 
that again this is v/ith malice and should be punitive damages 
4 
that relate to, again, your third cause of action. 
5 
So essentially you're relying then on the state-
6 
ments made in the first cause of action to support the relief 
you ask in the balance of your amended complaint; is that 
8 
correct? 
9 . 
MR. LEVIHE: Well, Your Honor, what we're setting 
out are four specific causes of action, 
11
 THE COURT: True. 
12 
MR. LEVINE: Four t h e o r i e s of r e c o v e r y , and each 
13 
cause of action we incorporate by reference the preceding 
14 
allegations as the basis for that. 
15 . 
THE COURT: Right. I understand. But just so that 
16 
I understand, it's these statements that you feel support the 
relief that you're asking in your other cause of action, be 
18 
it punitive relief or otherwise. 
19 
MR. LEVINE: T h a t ' s c o r r e c t , Your Honor. 
20 
THE COURT: Okay. Then I would like to ask: In 
21 
relating to those elements or statements set out, sub (a) 
22 
through (j), rather than, as you say, taking one and say, 
23 
"How does this relate to defamation, (a)"—you know, "It's 
24 
grown like Topsy and become burdensome," or "I appoint Lyle 
25 
Negus for the completion of an investigation in the Parks 
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1
 Department." Further statements (c), (d), (e)—well, not (e) j 
2
 but (f) does refer to an investigation, and also (g), that 
3
 "The administrative investigation is complete, no further 
4 
comment will be made." 
5
 Taking them all together, as you pointed out, and 
looking at the whole picture, taking all of those comments 
together reveal anything other than statements made by the 
8
 Mayor that there was firing of Mr. Eames, that there was an 
9
 investigation of the Parks Department and an administrative 
10
 investigation being made about that department and Mr. 
11
 Eamesfs involvement? Is there anything other than that 
12
 collectively that all of those statements say? 
13
 MR. LEVINE: Collectively that all of those 
14
 statements say? There are references made to another investi-f 
15
 gation. This mysterious other investigation. It has been 
16
 made public. It's never been resolved. 
17
 THE COURT: By who? 18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. LEVINE: By the Mayor. 
THE COURT: Where did he ever say that? 
MR. LEVINE: I'll refer to once again specifically 
subparagraph (f) in the memorandum from Mayor Daines to the 
plaintiff, which, as I said, was published to third parties 
as is required under defamation. 
It says, "Doug Eames has been terminated as 
director of the Logan Parks Department and is discharged from 
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x
 City employment effective immediately. The administrative 
2
 investigation is complete." And he goes on to say, "No 
3
 comment on any other investigation will be made by me or my 
4
 office." 
5
 Up until this point nobody really knew about any 
6
 other investigation. When you say "any other investigation," 
7
 immediately that says that there are other investigations 
8
 taking place, and that creates more turmoil, more questions. 
9
 What other investigations? What are they checking into? 
10
 Who's doing the investiqation, the F.B.I. , the C.I.A., the 
11
 National Security Council, the City of Logan? The Mayor made 
12 a specific reference to any other investigations which may be 
13
 taking place specifically, once again, in subparagraph (g). 
14
 The Mayor once again said, "No comment on any other investi-
15
 gation will be made by me or my office." What other investi-
16
 gation? We've shown through depositions that it raised a 
17
 question in at least one person's mind, "What's the investi-
gation about?" It creates a suspicious type atmosphere. 
19
 What's going on, what did he do wrong? By innuendo it puts 
20
 about this aura that there's another investigation going on, 
21
 there were wrongdoings that were done, possible mismanagement 
22
 who knows what else. Criminal, whatever. And we confirm 
23
 that by Richard Wright's deposition that two and a half years 
24
 later they're still in a position, there's still an open 
25
 investigation file, for what purpose nobody knows. 
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THE COURT1: But i s n ' t t h a t between t h e C i t y P o l i c e 
1 
and Mr. Eames? W h a t ' s t h a t a o t t o do w i t h t h e Mayor ' s comment} 
2
 i 
that as far as his administrative investigation is concerned 
3 
i t ' s closed? 4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. LEVINE: Well, I think there is a duty, and as 
I said this goes— 
THE COURT: But would you have him say, "Our 
administrative investigation is completed and closed, but 
it's within ny knowledge that the City still has an open file 
and as far as I know it's still an open file and is under 
investigation"? What if he'd said that? Would that have 
taken him off the hook? 
MR. LEVINS: No, it wouldn't have taken him off the 
hook, no, 
THE COURT: Apparently it's a true statement, from 
your depositions. 
MR. LEVINE: Well, and the ^ayor admits it's a 
true statement, but what we're saying is that incumbent with 
making this statement there's also a duty to clear up the 
error afterwards. 
THE COURT: Well, where does his duty lie then? 
What should he have done? 
MR. LEVINE: What should he have done? He should 
have made public at some point in time what exactly the 
investigation is, what it was that they were investigating. 
-22 
10 
11 
12 
1
 Things like that. It's a very simple thing. That's the 
2
 whole thing. This whole thing could have been avoided. It's 
3
 a very simple thing. Call him in, say, "Look, you're being 
4
 investigated for this, that or the other," and at least let 
5
 Mr* Eames know. But when you have this controversy, this 
6
 kind of all of a sudden suspension, investigation, the 
7
 investigation is complete, that's it, and then he's fired, 
8 he doesn't even know. 
9
 I'm not saving—once again, the Mayor has every 
right to fire him, for whatever reasons; that's not in con-
tention. But what I'm saying is when you create this kind 
of an aura, Mr. Eames doesn't even know what investigation, 
13 baloney, whatever is going on. 
14
 THE COURT: Is there any indication the Mayor 
15
 knew? 
16
 MR. LEVINE: Well, the Mayor certainly knew other 
17
 investigations were going on. 
18
 THE COURT: Yes, that's what I say. 
19
 MR. LEVFIE: And he knew an administrative 
investigation had taken place and was concluded. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. LEVINE: But when you take that coupled with 
a subsequent', termination, right there, without coming 
forth and stating, "Well, I terminated Mr. Eames and the 
reason I terminated Mr. Eames is because our investigation 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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you leave this defamation. That's the only word I can find. 
It's strictly defamation. When he sets into progress these 
comments that create questions in people's minds and through 
innuendo--I mean it's clear that just those statements in and 
of itself without a further explanation, which should have 
taken place either to Mr. Eames or publicly, the innuendo is 
that there's wrongdoing, they found something on him. 
THE COURT: Well, that goes back to my other 
question. Suppose he had went on? 
MR. LEVIHE: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: There's nothing to indicate that the 
Mayor knows anything other than there's still an open file 
as far as the City Police Department is concerned, according 
to your deposition. Or at least the quote you stated from 
the deposition, and that the file is still open. But that 
doesn't mean that—you say, "Well, the Mayor should have gone 
on and revealed or stated that he was taking chicken eggs or 
money or whatever,1' but there is nothing that you allege in 
here that he knows anything other than his administrative 
investigation is closed and that he's making no comment about 
other investigations, which is presumably the City Police 
Department which is still open, I suppose, from what you've 
-24-
18 
22 
1 told me. 
2 MR. LEVIIIR: Well, you know, he should have stopped 
3 right there. "Mr. Eames is terminated, the administrative 
4
 investigation is complete." Once he went the extra step and 
5 uttered those few extra words, "No comment on any other 
6
 investigation will be made by me or my office," I think that 
7
 was an unsolicited response. It's clear at least from this 
8 memorandum he was never asked as to any other investigation. 
9 If he had been asked, if a reporter had asked him, "Well, 
10 what about the police investigation, what about the F.B.I. 
U investigation?" then I think he would have been right by 
12 saying, "No comment." But when he puts forth that extra 
13 effort in my opinion to bring forth that unsolicited comment J 
14 referring to other investigations, I think immediately he 
15 creates by innuendo the aura that he knows something more, 
16 that there are other investigations taking place, that there 
n J is wrongdoing in the air. 
THE COURT: So I get it correctly then, you're 
19 j relying on his statement that "No comment on any other 
20 investigations will be made" as the nexus of your theory 
21 j of defamation and wilfull and malicious statements as 
against Mr. Eames? I'm simply trying to narrow down the 
23 I issues. 
24 MR. LEVINE: Yeah. Let me just—(Examining the 
25 file) 
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1 THE COURT: In other words, if he had said, "The 
2 administrative investigation has closed," and if he'd stopped 
3 right there and had not said, "Mo comment on any other 
4
 investigations will be made," would you say then there would 
5 have been no cause of action? 
6 MR. LEVIN": No, because I think you also have to 
7 take into account that Mr. Eantes was never informed as to 
8 what he was being investigated for, 
9 THE COURT: How does that defame him if he wasn't 
10 informed? 
11 MR. LEVINE: Well, because it became public at 
12 that point. Once the Mayor fired Mr. Eames, going b a c k — 
13 first suspended h i m — 
14 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
15 MR. LEVINE: — a n d said, "An investigation is going 
16 on," and you don't comment about the results of the investi-
17 gation or what you are investigating, and then there is a 
18 termination, that again is a defamatory action too. 
19 So in addition to the statement, I'm also saying 
20 that the actions that took place also are defamation. 
21 THE COURT: Are you saying it's defamation then in 
22 a negative sort of way not to say something? 
23 MR. LEVINE: I think if any city official takes 
24 the initiative to open their mouth and make comments on the 
25 firing, termination, or investigations that's taking place, 
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1
 I feel that that imposes upon them an affirmative duty, 
2
 especially in light of the fact when these comments and the 
3
 I situation involved is a tense situation, that a reasonable 
man would know it could cause harm to another individual's 
5
 ] standing in the community and reputation, they have an 
affirmative duty upon them to carry through with their state-
7
 I merits and make sure that a defamation does hot occur, and 
8
 j that is by letting it out to the public and Mr. Eames as to 
what happened. 
In other words, if you set the stage for defama-
tion, if you set the stage and act in a way which you unrea-
4 
6 
9 
10 
11 
12
 j sonably know i s going to cause injury to an ind iv idua l ' s 
13
 ' reputat ion, s ta tus in the community, which the Mayor did by 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
making those statements, and I think a reasonable man would 
have known that the comments such as this and under the 
circumstances and the relationships of the parties was going 
to cause injury to this man's status in the community, then 
you have an affirmative duty, which the Mayor did not abide 
by his duty. He breached his duty by carrying through and 
making full disclosure so as to avoid the defamation. But 
when you leave everything hanging in the air after making 
such statements, that's defamatory, and that's the essence 
of our first cause of action. We're saying— 
THE COURT: And the rest of them. 
MR. LEVIKE: And the rest of them, right. And the 
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1
 words too. 
2 THE COURT; Okay. Thank you. 
3
 MR. LEVIHE: Sure. 
4
 MR. BARRETT: I'm going to be very brief, Your 
5
 Honor. I'd just like to comment on the Mayor's affidavit. 
6
 It states factual natter in there and not legal conclusions. 
7
 Mr. Levine objects to it on the ground that it's self-
8 serving. Nell, we know that a self-serving statement may 
9
 come in as an exception to the hearsay rule, but I never 
10 heard of an affidavit that anybody made anywhere that wasn't 
11 self-serving. That's the purpose of making an affidavit, 
12 and so it's a lot of nonsense to try to dispose of it by 
13
 saying that it's self-serving. 
14 They haven't rebutted anything in that affidavit. 
15
 I certainly think that all four claims or all four causes 
16
 of action are entirely reliant upon the statement of facts 
17
 in the first claim and that that first claim is woefully 
deficient. To say that the Mayor defamed somebody by saying, 
19
 I "I have no comment," really opens the door. Or to say that 
20
 someone is defamed because someone says, "An investigation is 
21 J going on" really opens the door too. It's just ridiculous. 
The law of defamation isn't about that at all. 
23 I N O W , the court can take judicial notice of the 
24
 I fact that Mr. Eames filed an action in the United States 
District Court alleging and attempting to show a lot of 25 
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th ings that Mr. Levine has been bringing up here, that is 
that the Mayor had some sort of a duty to give Mr. Earaes a 
hearing. 
Well/ the fact is that that action was dismissed 
because Mr. Eames didn't ask for a hearing and take— 
MR. LEVINE: I'm going to object, Your Honor. I 
don't think a District Court action has any bearing in this 
case. 
MR. BARRETT: It's a matter of record. I think it 
does. 
THE COURT: Well, I could take judicial notice of 
it, but I don't think it's relevant, for this reason: That 
counsel for Mr. Eames has just stated that they're not 
contesting the right of the Mayor to fire him. 
MR. BARRETT: Yes. Yes. 
THE COURT: So whether he has a hearing or whether 
he asks for one is not relevant. 
MR. BARRETT: Mo, that may not be—that may be 
so here, but there's been an awful lot of talk about an 
duty 
affirmative/foii the part of the Mayor to have some sort of 
a news conference or something, and I don't think there is 
any such duty nor had that point even been raised until 
today, and so we'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll give you a written 
decision on that, and you should have it v/ithin the next two 
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1
 days. Two or three days. 
2 MR. LEVINE: Thank you very .much, Your Honor. 
3
 THE COURT: Court's in recess. 
4
 J (Court thereupon recessed at 2:55 p.m.) 
5 
6 
7
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CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, LICo N0o 27, 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS EAMES, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
THE CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, A 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; NEWEL 
G. DAINES, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL 
AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 
MAYOR OF THE CITY OF LOGAN, 
UTAH; DOES 1 THROUGH 25, 
INCLUSIVE, 
DEFENDANTS. 
CIVIL CASE NO. 21426 
DEPOSITION OF: 
DALE 0. NELSON 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 23RD DAY OF MAY, 
1984, THE DEPOSITION OF DALE 0. NELSON, CALLED AS A WITNESS 
AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PLAINTIFF, WAS TAKEN BEFORE LORI 
PARKER, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL 
REPORTER, AND NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, 
HOLDING C.S.R. LICENSE NUMBER 210, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 
2:30 P.M. OF SAID DAY AT THE CACHE COUNTY HALL OF JUSTICE, 
ROOM 201, 160 NORTH MAIN, LOGAN, UTAH. 
THAT SAID DEPOSITION WAS TAKEN PURSUANT TO 
NOTICE. 
LORI PARKER, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
1 THE BASIS OF INFORMATION THAT'S GOING AROUND, BUT, AS I SAY, 
2 IT HASN'T INFLUENCED ME. 
3 Q YOU KNOW DOUG, AND YOU--
4 A BECAUSE I KNOW DOUG WELL ENOUGH. 
5 Q YOU KNOW THAT, IN YOUR MIND, THESE ALLEGATIONS 
6 ARE NOT TRUE? 
7 A THAT'S THE WAY I WOULD INTERPRET IT. 
8 Q HAVE YOUR QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ALLEGED 
9 WRONGDOINGS, HAVE THEY BEEN ANSWERED IN YOUR MIND? 
10 A WELL, THE THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN SAID HAVEN'T BEEN 
11 ANSWERED TO ANYBODY, I DON'T THINK, BUT THEY HAVEN'T 
12 INFLUENCED ME, AS I HAVE SAID. I DON'T KNOW WHAT KIND OF AN 
13 ANSWER YOU'RE SEARCHING FOR THERE. 
(u)\ Q WELL, JUST, YOU KNOW, TRUTHFULLY WHAT KIND OF AN 
5)| IMPRESSION YOU GET FROM EVERYTHING THAT'S GOING ON AS 
G)\ BASICALLY A RESIDENT OF THE CITY OF LOGAN. THAT'S BASICALLY 
17y>| WHAT I'M TRYING TO GET'. 
Q8) A WELL, I THINK THE IMPRESSION THAT ONE GETS IS 
(19J THAT --OF COURSE, IT'S EASY TO CONVICT A PERSON WITH 
(ffi)\ CONVERSATION, AND THE IMPRESSION ONE GETS IS THAT THERE'S AN 
/V)\ INVESTIGATION GOING ON, THAT THERE'S BEEN SOME MISHANDLING OF 
(jH FUNDS, THERE'S BEEN SOME MISUSE OF PROPERTY, YOU KNOW, IN 
2^3J RELATIONSHIP TO THE JOB, AND THAT SORT OF THING, AND IT'S 
/2M NEVER BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THAT'S TRUE. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IT'S A LITTLE BIT ANNOYING TO ME AS A CITIZEN TO 
SEE THOSE KINDS OF ALLEGATIONS AND NOT TO HAVE ANY 
SUBSTANTIATION FROM INVESTIGATIONS OR OTHERWISE, AND I'VE 
NEVER SEEN THAT. I'VE NEVER HEARD IT, SO, YOU KNOW, A PERSON 
WOULD BE A LITTLE BIT DISTURBED AT NOT HAVING BETTER 
INFORMATION, AND YET THE IMPLICATION IS THAT SOMEBODY'S NOT 
DOING THE RIGHT THING AS FAR AS THE JOB IS CONCERNED. 
Q WERE THESE RUMORS AND IMPRESSIONS, AS BEST AS YOU 
CAN REMEMBER AND THOSE THAT ARE PRESENT IN YOUR MIND, WERE 
THEY IN THE AIR OR IN THE AREA PRIOR TO DOUGTS BEING 
SUSPENDED IN MAY OF 1982? 
A NO. THEY CAME AFTER THE SUSPENSION. 
Q BEFORE THAT, WAS THERE ANY DISCUSSION THAT YOU 
CAN RECALL^-
A NO. 
Q --ABOUT DOUG AND POSSIBLE . . . 
A NO. 
0 DO YOU KNOW FOR A FACT, BASED UPON YOUR PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE, YOUR ACQUAINTANCE WITH DOUG AND OTHER PEOPLE IN 
THE COMMUNITY THAT YOU KNOW THAT MAY NOT KNOW DOUG AS WELL, 
DO YOU KNOW IF THERE ARE PEOPLE, FROM YOUR PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
AND OPINION, THAT MAY HAVE AN IMPRESSION THAT DOUG MAY BE 
GUILTY OF SOMETHING, PEOPLE THAT DON!T KNOW DOUG AS WELL AS 
YOU? 
MR. BARRETT: I OBJECT TO THAT QUESTION. IT CALLS 
10 
1 CLEARLY FOR SPECULATION. 
2 Q (BY MR. LEVINE) WELL, I'LL ASK YOU FOR YOUR 
3 OPINION. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT--LET ME 
« REPHRASE IT. I'LL TRY AND MAKE IT SIMPLER. BASED UPON YOUR 
5 ACQUAINTANCE WITH DOUG, BEING A CITIZEN OF LOGAN, CACHE 
6 COUNTY, LIVING IN THE AREA FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, HAVING 
7 CONTACT AT THE UNIVERSITY, IS IT YOUR OPINION THAT THERE ARE 
8 PEOPLE THAT YOU'VE COME IN CONTACT WITH THAT HAVE EXPRESSED 
9 TO YOU A BELIEF THAT DOUG IS POSSIBLY GUILTY OF SOMETHING? 
10 A NO. THE PEOPLE I'VE TALKED TO HAVEN'T INDICATED 
H THAT HE'S GUILTY OF ANYTHING. 
12 Q ARE THEY GENERALLY PEOPLE WHO KNOW DOUG PRETTY 
13 WELL? 
14 A A LOT OF THEM. OF COURSE, I HAVEN'T DISCUSSED IT 
15 WIDELY, SO THERE WOULD BE A LIMITATION ON HOW FAR THAT WOULD 
16 GO. 
17 Q IN YOUR OPINION, BASED UPON YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF 
18 DOUG AND THE AREA HERE AND BEING A LONG-TIME RESIDENT, DO YOU 
19 FEEL THAT—I'LL GET THE EXACT WORDING, TOO--DO YOU FEEL THAT 
20 THESE STATEMENTS GOING AROUND IMPUTE TO DOUG THE COMMISSION 
21 OF A CRIME OR DEGRADE HIS CHARACTER? 
22 A YES, I THINK THEY DO. 
23 MR. BARRETT: I THINK I'LL OBJECT TO THAT QUESTION ON 
24 THE GROUND IT'S EXTREMELY LEADING. IN FACT, IT SUGGESTS THE 
25 ANSWER. YOU HAVEN'T EVEN STATED WHAT THE ALLEGATIONS ARE. 
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1
 HE'S ANSWERED "YES" WITHOUT YOUR EVEN STATING WHAT THE 
2 SO-CALLED RUMORS ARE THAT ARE GOING AROUND. 
3 MR. LEVINE: WELL, I'LL TRY AND REPHRASE THAT. 
4
 Q THE RUMORS WHICH YOU TESTIFIED T O — I ' L L LET YOU 
5 SAY WHAT THE RUMORS WERE ABOUT--WHAT IS YOUR IMPRESSION THAT 
6
 THEY DO, IF ANYTHING, TO DOUG'S CHARACTER OR OFFICE WHICH HE 
7 HELD OR HIS PROFESSION, TRUST, ET CETERA? 
8 A WELL, THE REASON I ANSWERED "YES" IS BECAUSE 
9 WE'VE TALKED ABOUT THE RUMORS THAT ARE GOING AROUND AND THE 
10 CONVERSATION THAT SEEMS TO BE RAMPANT RELATIVE TO THE 
11 MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS AND MISUSE OF THE MATERIAL THINGS 
12 ON THE JOB AND THAT SORT OF THING. THAT WOULD LEAD ME TO 
13 GIVE THE ANSWER THAT I DID. IN OTHER WORDS, THE RUMORS HAVE 
14 INDICATED A WRONGDOING OF SOME SORT. 
15 I Q WHEN WE TALK--EXCUSE ME FOR INTERRUPTING. 
16 A THAT'S THE BASIS ON WHICH I ANSWERED. 
17 Q NOW, ARE YOU BASING THIS ON ANY ONE STATEMENT 
18 THAT YOU RECALL BEING MADE, OR IS IT THE WHOLE TOTALITY OF 
19 THE CIRCUMSTANCES FROM START UP UNTIL NOW? 
20 A THE WHOLE TOTALITY. I THINK THAT WHEN THE 
21 NEWSPAPERS COME OUT AMD SAY THAT LOGAN CITY IS MAKING AN 
22 INVESTIGATION AND NEVER COME UP WITH ANYTHING AND THEN IN 
23 CASUAL CONVERSATION I HEAR PEOPLE SUGGEST OR IMPLY THAT 
24 SOMEBODY IS NOT DOING THINGS ACCORDING TO THE WAY THEY'RE 
25 EXPECTED TO PERFORM, THEN YOU'RE LED TO BELIEVE THAT THESE THINGS 
12 
1 EXIST, BUT, AS I SAID, I DON'T BELIEVE THEM BECAUSE I DON'T 
2 WANT THE PERSON CONVICTED UNTIL THERE'S MORE EVIDENCE THAN 
3 WHAT YOU HEAR. 
4
 Q AND WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OR IMPRESSION AS TO 
5 WHERE THESE RUMORS OR ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING STEM FROM OR 
6 LIE? 
7 A WHERE DO I THINK THEY COME FROM? I DON'T KNOW 
8 WHERE THEY COME FROM. 
9 Q DO YOU HAVE AN OPINION AS TO HOW THESE 
10 IMPRESSIONS, RUMORS, STATEMENTS, HOW THEY CAN BE QUELLED OR 
11 WHO CAN QUELL THEM? 
12 A WELL, I THINK THE ONLY WAY THEY COULD BE QUELLED 
13 WOULD BE A FORMAL INVESTIGATION WITH THE FACTS BEING MADE 
14 KNOWN FROM'THAT INVESTIGATION. YOU ASSUME FROM WHAT YOU READ 
15 IN THE NEWSPAPERS ORIGINALLY THAT THAT WAS ONGOING AND THAT 
16 SOMETHING EVENTUALLY WOULD EVOLVE, BUT I'VE NEVER SEEN 
17 ANYTHING TAKE PLACE, AND THAT'S BEEN WHAT? TWO YEARS AGO? 
18 Q SO IS IT YOUR OPINION, ONCE AGAIN, THAT IT IS THE 
19 CITY OF LOGAN WHO MUST ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS? 
20 MR. BARRETT: LEADING QUESTION. ALL THESE QUESTIONS 
21 HAVE BEEN LEADING, AND I OBJECT TO THEM AND HAVE A CONTINUING 
22 OBJECTION ON THAT GROUND. 
23 Q (BY MR. LEVINE) YOU CAN ANSWER. THE OBJECTION 
24 WILL BE NOTED. 
25 A YOU WANT ME TO ANSWER THE QUESTION? 
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 Q YES. 
2 A YEAH. I WOULD THINK THAT IF THAT'S THE SOURCE OF 
3
 THE ALLEGATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS, THEN CERTAINLY THEY OUGHT 
4
 TO BE ANSWERED IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. AS FAR AS I CAN 
5 DETERMINE WITH THE PUBLIC INFORMATION, NOTHING HAS BEEN 
6
 ANSWERED. 
7
 MR. LEVINE: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
8 EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. BARRETT: 
10 Q MR. NELSON, HAVE YOU TALKED TO MR. LEVINE ABOUT 
11 THIS MATTER BEFORE THIS DEPOSITION TODAY? 
12 A WHO? 
13 Q MR. LEVINE. 
14 A NO. 
15 Q HAVE YOU TALKED TO MR. EAMES--
16 A NO. 
17 Q --ABOUT THIS CASE AT ALL? 
18 A NO. YOU MEAN BEFORE TODAY? 
19 Q YES . 
20 A I CASUALLY TALKED TO HIM AFTER IT HAPPENED, I 
21 GUESS, ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO AND ASKED HIM IF THERE WAS 
22 ANYTHING TO THE ALLEGATIONS AND THIS SORT OF THING, BUT I 
23 NEVER GOT ANY INFORMATION. 
24 Q ALL RIGHT. ARE YOU RELATED TO MR. EAMES? 
25 A YES. 
